



European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory

3/14 July 1995, Gerzensee

Revised Final Programme

Monday 3 July

Afternoon

Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics

Tilman Börgers (University College London)

Rajiv Sarin (Texas A&M University)

Discussant:

Christopher Harris (Nuffield College, Oxford)

Evening

Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria

Philippe Jéhiel (CERAS, Paris)

Tuesday 4 July

Workshop on Bounded Rationality

Some Thoughts on Models of Bounded Rationality

Ariel Rubinstein (Tel Aviv University)

Complexity and Network in Repeated Games II: General

Strategies

Inkoo Choo (University of Chicago) Hao Li (University of Chicago)

Complexity Costs and the Incompleteness of Contracts

Luca Anderlini (St. John's College, Cambridge) Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)

Wednesday 5 July

Morning

Auctions vs. Negotiations

Jeremy Bulow (Stanford University)

Paul Klemperer (St Catherine's College, Oxford and CEPR)

Discussant:

Klaus Schmidt (Universität Bonn)

Evening

Social Learning and Costly Information Acquisition Roberto Burguet (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC),

Barcelona)

Xavier Vives (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona

and CEPR)

Thursday 6 July

Workshop on Market Design

Issues in the Design of New Markets, How to Set a

Minimum Acceptable Bids

R Preston McAfee (University of Texas)

Designing and Playing the Game: the US Spectrum

Auction

Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)

How (Not to) Sell to Interacting Buyers

Philippe Jéhiel (CERAS, Paris)

Benny Moldovanu (Universität Bonn) Aennio Stachetti (Michigan University)

Multi-Object Auctions: On the Use of Combinational Bids

Fernando Branco (Universidade Católica Portuguesa and

CEPR)

Friday 7 July

Morning

Demand and Supply in New Markets: Diffusion with

Bilateral Learning

Nikolaos Vettas (Duke University)

Discussant:

Kai-Uwe Kūhn (IAE and CEPR)

Evening

Optimal Patent Renewals

Francesca Cornelli (London Business School and CEPR)

Mark Schankerman (EBRD)

Monday 10 July

Morning

A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks

Matthew O Jackson (Northwestern University)
Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern University)

Discussant:

Patrick Bolton (ECARE, Université Libre de Bruxelles and

CEPR)

Evening

How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?
George J Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin)
Jeroen R Swinkels (Northwestern University)

Tuesday 11 July

Morning

Multi-Dimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behaviour in

Financial Markets

Christopher Avery (Harvard University)

Peter Zemsky (INSEAD)

Discussant:

Peter Sorensen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Evening

Optimal Auditing with Heterogeneous Incomes Sources Inés Macho-Stadler (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) J David Pérez-Castrillo (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Wednesday 12 July

Morning

Bargaining and Investment in a Two-Sided Matching Model

Harold L Cole (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)

George J Mallath (University of Pennsylvania)

Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

Discussant:

József Sakoviks (Institut d'Analisi Econòmica (CSIC),

Barcelona)

Evening

Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by

Markets Games

Luis Corchón (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones

Económicas y Universidad de Alicante)

Simon Wilkie (California Institute of Technology)

Thursday 13 July

Half-Day Workshop on Information in Organizations

Incentives in M-Form and U-Form Organizations

Eric S Maskin (Harvard University) Yingyi Qian (Stanford University)

Chenggang Xu (London School of Economics)

Evening

Disclosure of Know-How in Research Joint Ventures
J David Pérez Castrillo (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Joel Sandonis (Universidad del Pais Vasco)

Friday 14 July

Market Structure and the Growth Process
Philippe Aghion (EBRD, London and CEPR)
Mathias Dewatripont (ECARE and CEPR)
Patrick Rey (ENSAE-CREST and CEPR)

Discussant:

John Roberts (Stanford University)

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