

European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET)

Studienzentrum Gerzensee, 5/16 July 2004

Programme

WEEK 1

Monday 5 July

08:30 – 09:30

The Impact of Leniency Programs on Cartels

*Patrick Rey (Université des Sciences Sociales de
Toulouse and CEPR)

Cecile Aubert (Univ. Paris IX Dauphine)

William Kovacic (George Washington University)

09:50 – 10:50

Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

*Volker Nocke (University of Pennsylvania)

Lucy White (Harvard Business School)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 – 21:30

Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions

John Asker (Harvard University)

*Estelle Cantillon (Harvard Business School and CEPR)

20:30 – 21:30

Competitive Experimentation with Private Information

Guiseppe Moscarini (Yale University)

*Francesco Squintani (University College London)

Tuesday 6 July

08:30 – 11:30

Focus Session: Law and Economics

Session Organizer: Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

On the Writing and Interpretation of Contracts

*Steven Shavell (Harvard University)

Legal Applications of Contract Theory

*Alan Schwartz (Yale University)

Courts and Contracts

*Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 – 21:30 Design and Enforcement of Legal Standards

*Giovanni Immordino (Universita di Salerno)

Marco Pagano (Universita di Salerno)

20:30 – 21:30 Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders

*Winand Emons (Universität Bern and CEPR)

Wednesday 7 July**08:30 – 09:30 Firm-Specific Training**

Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)

*Christopher Harris (King's College, Cambridge)

09:50 – 10:50 Employer Learning and General Human Capital

*Jan Eeckhout (University of Pennsylvania)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 – 21:30 Flexible Contracts

Paolo Ghirardato (University of Turin)

*Piero Gottardi (University of Venice)

Jean-Marc Tallon (Universite Paris I)

20:30 – 21:30 A Smooth Model of Decision Making Under Ambiguity

Peter Klibanoff (Northwestern University)

Massimo Marinacci (University of Turin)

*Sujoy Mukerji (University of Oxford)

Thursday 8 July

08:30 – 11:30 Focus Session: Allocation Mechanisms without Prices

Session Organizer: Michele Piccione (London School of Economics)

Social Assets

*George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)

Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

**Better Mechanism Design by Transferring Utilities
Across Agents via Non-monetary Instruments**

*Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Columbia University)

Equilibria in the Jungle

*Michele Piccione (London School of Economics)
Ariel Rubinstein (Tel-Aviv University and New York
University)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 – 21:30

Qualitative Voting

*Rafael Hortala-Vallve (London School of Economics)

20:30 – 21:30

A Model of the Origins of Basic Property Rights

*Abhinay Muthoo (University of Essex)

Friday 9 July

08:30 – 09:30

Multidimensional Cheap Talk

*Gilat Levy (London School of Economics and CEPR)
*Ronny Razin (New York University and CEPR)

09:50 – 10:50

Competition over Non-Bayesian Agents

*Ran Spiegler (Tel-Aviv University)

Evening Session:

20:30 – 21:30

Contracting in the Shadow of the Law

*Nicola Gennaioli (Harvard University)

20:30 – 21:30

Discretion and Partisans

*Elisabetta Iossa (Brunel University)
Giuliana Palumbo (Bank of Italy)

Week 2

Monday 12 July

08:30 - 09:30

Building Rational Cooperation

James Andreoni (University of Wisconsin)

*Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin)

9:50 - 10:50

Media as Watchdogs: The Role of News Media in Electoral Competition

*Jimmy Chan (John Hopkins University)

Wing Suen (University of Hong Kong)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 - 21:30

Party Governance and Electoral Competition

Micael Castanheira (Universite Libre de Bruxelles)

Benoit Crutzen (Universite Libre de Bruxelles)

*Nicolas Sahuguet (Universite Libre de Bruxelles)

20:30 - 21:30

Reputational Cheap Talk or Late Informed Betting and the Favourite-Long Shot Bias

*Marco Ottaviani (London Business School and CEPR)

*Peter Sorensen (Kobenhavns Uniersitet)

20:30 - 21:30

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University of Essex)

George J Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)

Stephen Morris (Yale University)

Tuesday 13 July

08:30 - 11:30

Focus Session: Models of Reputation

Session Organizer: Jeffrey Ely (Boston University)

Reputation in the Short-, Medium-, and Long-Run

Jeffrey Ely (Boston University)

Career Concerns in Financial Markets

Amil Dasgupta (London School of Economics)

*Andrea Prat (London School of Economics and CEPR)

Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships

*Martin Cripps (Washington University, St. Louis)

*George J Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)

Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 - 21:30

Static Efficiency and Dynamic Incentives

*Heski Bar-Isaac (New York University)

Juanjo Ganuza (U. Pompeu Fabra)

20:30 - 21:30

Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations

Philippe Jehiel (CERAS-ENPC, University College London and CEPR)

*Frederic Koessler (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

Wednesday 14 July

08:30 - 9:30

Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Auctions

*Ian Jewitt (Nuffield College, Oxford and CEPR)

09:50 - 10:50

Towards a Theory of Deception

*David Ettinger (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

Philippe Jehiel (CERAS-ENPC and University College London)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 - 21:30

Principal and Expert Agent

*James Malcomson (University of Oxford)

20:30 - 21:30

Iterative Dominance and the Theory of Sequential Bargaining

*Christopher Tyson (Nuffield College, Oxford)

Thursday 15 July

08:30 - 11:30

Focus Session: Strategic Behavior and Educational Outcomes

Session Organizer: Christopher Avery (Harvard University)

School Choice at Boston Public Schools

*Tayfun Sonmez (Koç University)

**Categorical Redistribution in Winner-Take-All
Markets**

*Roland Fryer (Harvard University)
Glenn Loury (Boston University)

**Equilibrium Information Disclosure: Grade Inflation
and Unraveling**

Michael Ostrovsky (Harvard University)
*Michael Schwarz (Harvard University)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 - 21:30 **Single-Agent Mechanism Design with Risk Averse
Parties**

*Dezso Szalay (Université de Lausanne)

20:30 - 21:30 **To Bundle or Not to Bundle or Public Provision of
Private Goods**

Hanming Fang (Yale University)
*Peter Norman (University of Wisconsin)

Friday 16 July

08:30 - 09:30 **Post-Schooling Wage Growth: Investment, Search,
and Learning**

Yona Rubinstein (Tel-Aviv University)
*Yoram Weiss (Tel-Aviv University)

9:50 - 10:50 **Reverse Discrimination and Efficiency in Education**

*Gianni de Fraja (University of York and CEPR)

* denotes speaker