

# EUROPEAN SUMMER SYMPOSIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY

Generously hosted by  
Study Center Gerzensee

Monday 2 – Friday 13 July 2012

## PROGRAMME

### WEEK 1

#### MONDAY 2 JULY

##### Morning Sessions

<b>08.30 - 09.45</b>	<b>Mismatch, Rematch and Investment</b> Thomas Gall (University of Bonn) *Patrick Legros (ECARES) Andrew Newman (Boston University)
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##### Evening Parallel Sessions

<b>20.30 - 21.30</b>	<b>Matching Multidimensional Types</b> Ilse Lindenlaub (European University Institute)	<b>Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules</b> *Tilman Börgers (University of Michigan) Doug Smith (Federal Trade Commission)
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#### TUESDAY 3 JULY

##### Focus Session on Matching

<i>Chair:</i>	<i>Jan Eeckhout (University College of London and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)</i>	
<b>08.30 - 09.45</b>	<b>Surplus Division and Efficient Matching</b> Benny Moldovanu (University of Bonn)	
<b>10.15 - 11.30</b>	<b>Matching Information</b> *Hector Chade (Arizona State University) Jan Eeckhout (University College of London and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)	

##### Evening Parallel Sessions

<b>20.30 - 21.30</b>	<b>Decision-Making and Implementation in Teams</b> *Marc Möller (Universität Bern) Jordi Blanes-i-Vidal (London School of Economics)	<b>Child Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender and Race</b> *Maria Giovanna Baccara (Washington University, St Louis) Allan Collard-Wexler (New York University) Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR) Leeat Yariv (California Institute of Technology)
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## WEDNESDAY 4 JULY

### Morning Sessions

08.30 - 09.45 | **Inequality and Risk-Taking Behaviour**  
Ed Hopkins (University of Edinburgh)

### Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30 | **Reciprocal Contracting**  
Michael Peters (University of British Columbia)

**Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets**  
\*Marek Pycia (Université de Toulouse I)  
Qingmin Liu (University of Pennsylvania)

## THURSDAY 5 JULY

### Focus Session on Matching

*Chair:* | *Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)*

08.30 - 09.45 | **Matching with Incomplete Information**  
\*Qingmin Liu (University of Pennsylvania)  
George J. Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)  
Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)  
Larry Samuelson (Yale University)

10.15- 11.30 | **Stable Marriage and Search Frictions**  
Stefan Lauermaun (University of Michigan)  
Georg Nöldeke (Universität Bonn and CEPR)

### Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30 | **The Supermodular Stochastic Ordering: Applications**  
\*Margaret Meyer (University of Oxford and CEPR)  
Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)

**Do Smarter Consumers Get Better Advice? An Analytical Framework and Evidence from German Private Pensions**  
Tabea Bucher-Koenen (Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy, Munich)  
\*Johannes Koenen (Universität Bonn)

## FRIDAY 6 JULY

### Morning Sessions

08.30 – 09:30 | **Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching**  
\*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University College London and CEPR)  
Ed Hopkins (University of Edinburgh)

### Morning Parallel Sessions

10:00 – 11:00 | **Pay-for-luck in CEO compensation: matching and efficient contracting**  
Pierre Chaigneau (HEC Montréal)  
\*Nicolas Sahuguet (Ecole des HEC)

**Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets**  
\*Renato Gomes (Toulouse School of Economics)  
Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)

## WEEK 2

### MONDAY 9 JULY

#### Morning Sessions

08.30 – 09:45	<b>Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters</b> Heski Bar-Isaac (New York University) *Joyee Deb (New York University)
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#### Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	<b>Rational Inattention and Organizational Focus</b> *Wouter Dessein (Columbia University Business School and CEPR) Andrea Galeotti (University of Essex) Tano Santos (Columbia University and CEPR)	<b>Optimal Certification Design</b> Sergey Kovbasyuk (EIEF)
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### TUESDAY 10 JULY

#### Focus Session on Communication and Information

Chair:	Marco Ottaviani (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University and CEPR)	
08.30 - 09.45	<b>A Conversational War of Attrition</b> Katalin Bognar (University of California, Los Angeles) *Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn (University of California, Los Angeles) Lones Smith (University of Wisconsin)	
10.15 - 11.30	In-Uck Park (University of Bristol)	

#### Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	<b>Manipulative Disclosure</b> Claudio Mezzetti (University of Warwick)	<b>Targeted Communication, Selective Disclosure, and Privacy</b> Florian Hoffmann (Goethe University Frankfurt) Roman Inderst (Goethe University Frankfurt and CEPR) Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR)
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### WEDNESDAY 11 JULY

#### Morning Sessions

08.30 - 09.45	<b>A Large-Market Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model</b> Xavier Vives (IESE, Barcelona-Madrid and CEPR)
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#### Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	<b>Cheap Talk With Two-Sided Private Information</b> Inés Moreno de Barreda	<b>Uniqueness and Comparative Statics in the Strategic Information Transmission Game</b> Dezső Szalay (Universität Bonn)
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## **THURSDAY 12 JULY**

### **Focus Session on Communication and Information**

<i>Chair:</i>	<i>Dezső Szalay (Universität Bonn)</i>
<b>08.30 - 09.45</b>	<b>Selling Information</b> *Johannes Hörner (Yale University and CEPR) Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford University)
<b>10.15 - 11.30</b>	<b>Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market</b> *William Fuchs (University of California Berkeley) Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford University)

### **Evening Parallel Sessions**

<b>20.30 - 21.30</b>	<b>Optimal Delay in Committees</b> Ettore Damiano (University of Toronto) *Hao Li (University of British Columbia) Wing Suen (University of Hong Kong)	<b>A Folk Theorem with Mediated Communication</b> David Rahman (University of Minnesota)
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## **FRIDAY 13 JULY**

### **Morning Sessions**

<b>08.30 - 09.30</b>	<b>Queues and Experiments</b> Martin Cripps (University College London) *Caroline Thomas (University of Texas, Austin)
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### **Morning Parallel Sessions**

<b>10.00- 11.00</b>	<b>Buybacks and opportunism in vertical contracting</b> João Montez (London Business School)	<b>Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case</b> *Tymofiy Mylovanov (Penn State University) Thomas Tröger (Universität Mannheim)
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\* Indicates the presenter.

### **Organisers:**

**Jan Eeckhout** (University College London and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)  
**Leonardo Felli** (London School of Economics and CEPR)  
**Marco Ottaviani** (Bocconi University and CEPR)  
**Dezső Szalay** (University of Bonn)

### **Organising Committee:**

**Jan Eeckhout** (University College London and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)  
**Leonardo Felli** (London School of Economics and CEPR)  
**Christian Hellwig** (University of California, Los Angeles and CEPR)  
**Matthew O. Jackson** (Stanford University)  
**Margaret Meyer** (Oxford University and CEPR)  
**Dirk Niepelt** (Study Center Gerzensee and CEPR)  
**Andrea Prat** (London School of Economics and CEPR)  
**Sven Rady** (Universität München and CEPR)  
**Patrick Rey** (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR)  
**Ran Spiegler** (Tel Aviv University)  
**Dezső Szalay** (University of Bonn)  
**Juuso Välimäki** (Helsinki School of Economics and CEPR)  
**Timothy Van Zandt** (INSEAD and CEPR)  
**Xavier Vives** (IESE Business School, Barcelona-Madrid and CEPR)  
**Lucy White** (Harvard Business School and CEPR)