

EUROPEAN SUMMER SYMPOSIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY

Generously hosted by Study Center Gerzensee

Supported by UniCredit & Universities Foundation

PROGRAMME

WEEK 1

Monday, 4 July

Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design I

08.30 – 09.30	Information and Market Power *Dirk Bergemann (Yale and CEPR)
09.30 – 10.30	Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange *Tomasz Sadzik (UCLA) With Pavel Andreyanov (UCLA)
10.30 – 11.00	Coffee break

Evening Parallel Session

20.30 – 21.30	Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms *Hans Gersbach (ETH Zürich and CEPR) With Volker Britz (ETH Zürich)	Dynamic Adverse Selection with a Patient Seller *Marc Möller (University of Bern) With Juan Beccuti (University of Bern)
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Tuesday, 5 July

Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design II

08.30 – 09.30	Data-Driven Incentive Alignment in Capitation Schemes *Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University) With Mark Braverman (Princeton University)
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Evening Parallel Session

20.30 – 21.30	Sophisticated Sincerity under Incomplete Information *Andreas Kleiner (University of Bonn) With Benny Moldovanu (University of Bonn and CEPR)	Selecting Applicants *Alexander Frankel (Booth, University of Chicago)
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Wednesday, 6 July

Morning Session

08.30 – 09.30

Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision

*Margaret A Meyer (University of Oxford and CEPR)

With Florian Ederer (Yale) and Richard Holden (University of New South Wales)

Evening Parallel Session

20.30 – 21.30

Dynamic Demand and Sequential Monopoly: A Model of Endogenous Screening

*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University of Texas at Austin and CEPR)

With Nikita Roketskiy (University College London)

A Theory of Crowdfunding - a mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard

*Roland Strausz (Humboldt University and CEPR)

Thursday, 7 July

Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design III

08.30 – 09.30

Efficient Bilateral Trade

*Marek Pycia (UCLA)

With Rod Garratt (UCSB)

09.30 – 10.30

Social Learning and Information Design with Model Misspecification

*Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania)

With Daniel Hauser (University of Pennsylvania)

10.30 – 11.00

Coffee break

Evening Parallel Session

20.30 – 21.30

Selection by Selection: The Case of University Admissions

*Ian Jewitt (University of Oxford and CEPR)

With Esteban Ortiz Ospina (Oxford)

Betting on Others' Bets: Unions of Surplus Extraction Mechanisms

*Alia Gizatulina (University of St Gallen)

Friday, 8 July

Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design IIII

08.30 – 09.30

Information Design

*Stephen Morris (Princeton University)

Morning Parallel Session

10.00 – 11.00

Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games

*Andreas Blume (University of Arizona)

Selling to Advised Buyers

*Anton Tsoy (EIEF)

With Andrey Malenko (MIT)

* Indicates the presenter

WEEK 2

Monday, 11 July

Focus Session on Games and Contracts: A Dynamic Perspective I

08.30 – 09.30	Even Up: Maintaining Relationships *Larry Samuelson (Yale) With Ennio S Stacchetti (New York University)
09.30 – 10.30	Bargaining with One-Sided Asymmetric Information and Nonstationary Behavioral Types *Ennio S Stacchetti (New York University) With Dilip Abreu (Princeton University) and David Pearce (New York University)
10.30 – 11.00	Coffee break

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 – 21.30	Strategic exit with random observations *Svetlana Boyarchenko (University of Texas at Austin)	Incentives for Endogenous Types: Taxation under Learning-by-Doing *Miltiadis Makris (University of Southampton) With Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)
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Tuesday, 12 July

Morning Session

08.30 – 09.30	Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game *Thomas Wiseman (University of Texas at Austin) With Ben Sperisen (Tulane University)
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Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 – 21.30	Private Learning and Exit Decisions in Collaboration *Anne-Katrin Roesler (Northwestern University) With Yingni Guo (Northwestern University)	Observation delays and cycles *Chantal Marlats (Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II) With Sidartha Gordon (Paris-Dauphine University) and Lucie Ménager (Paris 2 University)
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Wednesday, 13 July

Morning Session

08.30 – 09.30	Recruiting Talent *Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn (UCLA) With Simon Board (UCLA) and Tomasz Sadzik (UCLA)
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Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 – 21.30	Residual Deterrence *Francesc Dilmé (University of Bonn) With Daniel Garrett (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR)	Career Concerns and Policy Intransigence - A Dynamic Signaling Model *Caroline Thomas (University of Texas at Austin)
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Thursday, 14 July

Focus Session on Games and Contracts: A Dynamic Perspective II

08.30 – 09.30	Treatment Effects and Experimentation *Martin William Cripps (University College London)
09.30 – 10.30	Implementation in Dynamic Environments *Johannes Hörner (Yale and CEPR)
10.30 – 11.00	Coffee break

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 – 21.30	Optimal Adaptive Testing: Informativeness and Incentives *Rahul Deb (University of Toronto) With Colin Stewart (University of Toronto)	Experimenting with Career Concerns *Marina Halac (Columbia University, University of Warwick and CEPR) With Ilan Kremer (The Hebrew University and University of Warwick)
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Friday, 15 July

Morning Session

08.30 – 09.30	Optimal Sequential Decision with Limited Attention *Konrad Mierendorff (University College London) With Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)
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Morning Parallel Session

10.00 – 11.00	Incentive Compatibility with Endogenous States *Suehyun Kwon (University College London)	Competing Mechanisms in Markets for Lemons *Piero Gottardi (EUI) With Sarah Auster (Bocconi University)
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* Indicates the presenter

ESSET 2016 Organisers:

Johannes Hörner (Yale University and CEPR)
Stephen Morris (Princeton University)
Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR)
Sven Rady (University of Bonn and CEPR)

Standing Organising Committee:

Chair: Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR)

Margaret Meyer (Oxford University and CEPR)

Dirk Niepelt (Study Center Gerzensee and CEPR)

Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR)

Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR)

Sven Rady (University of Bonn and CEPR)

Xavier Vives (IESE Business School, Barcelona and CEPR)

Lucy White (Harvard Business School and CEPR)