



STUDY CENTER GERZENSEE

EUROPEAN SUMMER SYMPOSIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY

Generously hosted by Study Center Gerzensee

PROGRAMME

<u> Week 1</u>

<u>Monday, 2 July</u>

Focus Session on Markets for Information

08.30 – 09.30	Test Design and Minimum Standards * Andy Skrzypacz (Stanford University)
09.30 - 10.00	Coffee break
10.00 – 11.00	Quantifying information and uncertainty * Emir Kamenica (University of Chicago)

Evening Parallel Session

20.30 - 21.30	Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes *Alex Smolin (University of Bonn)	Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition
		*Annie Liang (University of Pennsylvania), with Xiaosheng Mu (Columbia University) and Vasilis Syrgkanis (Microsoft Research)

Tuesday, 3 July

Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30	Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion	
	*Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University), with Kyungmin (Teddy) Kim and Konrad	
	Mierendorff	

Evening Parallel Session

20.30 - 21.30	Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment: An Information Design	Demand for Privacy, selling consumer information, and consumer hiding vs.
	Approach	opt-out
	*Vasiliki Skreta (University College	*Simon Anderson (University of
	London and CEPR), with Laura Doval	Virginia and CEPR)
	(California Institute of Technology)	

Wednesday, 4 July

Focus Session on Markets for Information

08.30 – 09.30	Privacy Protection and Consumer Retention *Bruno Jullien (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR) and Mike Riordan (Columbia University)
09.30 - 10.00	Coffee Break
10.00 - 11.00	Price Customization and Targeting in Many-to-Many Matching Markets *Renato Gomes (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR) and Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Session

20.30 - 21.30	Information aggregation and the	The Simple Economics of Optimal
	efficiency of emissions markets	Persuasion
	*Estelle Cantillon (ECARES and CEPR)	*Piotr Dworczak (University of Chicago)

<u>Thursday, 5 July</u>

Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30	Information Acquisition and Use by Networked Players		
	*David Myatt (London Business School) and Chris Wallace (University of		
	Manchester)		

Evening Parallel Sessions

EnvironmentAggregation*Benjamin Golub (Harvard University),Markets	y and Information ion in Heterogeneous nbaz-Salehi (Northwestern y)
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<u>Friday, 6 July</u>

Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30	Information Design: Insights from Orderings of Dependence and Heterogeneity	
	*Margaret A Meyer (Oxford University and CEPR)	

Morning Session

10.00 - 11.00	Revenue Guarantee Equivalence	The Effect of Analyst Coverage on
	*Benjamin Brooks (University of	Corporate Voluntary Disclosure, Price
	Chicago), with Stephen Morris and Dirk	Efficiency and Liquidity
	Bergemann	*Ilan Kremer (Hebrew University),
		with Sivan Frenkel (Tel Aviv
		University) and Ilan Guttman (NYU)

* Indicates the presenter

<u>WEEK 2</u>

<u>Monday, 9 July</u>

Focus Session on Misspecified Models

08.30 – 09.30	Data-Driven Regulation: Theory and Application *Sylvain Chassang (New York University)
09.30 – 10.30	Overabundant Information and Learning Traps *Annie Liang (University of Pennsylvania), with Xiaosheng Mu (Columbia University)
10.30 - 11.00	Coffee break
11:00 – 12.00	The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference *George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Adverse Selection in Distributive Politics	l Don't Know
	*S. Nageeb Ali (Penn State University)	*Matthew Backus (Columbia
		University)

<u>Tuesday, 10 July</u>

Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30	Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning	
	*Philipp Strack (University of California, Berkeley and CEPR)	

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	The Culture of Overconfidence	Procurement with Unforeseen
	*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University of	Contingencies
	Texas, Austin and CEPR) with Caroline	*Klaus M. Schmidt (University of
	Thomas (University of Texas, Austin)	Munich and CEPR)

Wednesday, 11 July

Focus Session on Misspecified Models

08.30 – 09.30	Causal Narratives and Political Polarization *Rani Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and CEPR)
09.30 – 10.30	Learning (Not to Trade?) in Large Worlds *Larry Samuelson (Yale University)
10.30 - 11.00	Coffee break
11:00 - 12.00	Competing Models *Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton University)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Modeling Ignorance without Bayesian	Investigation with forgetful liars
	Beliefs	*Philippe Jehiel (University College
	*Olivier Compte (Paris-Jourdan Sciences	London)
	Economique)	

Thursday, 12 July

Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30

Information Design in Misspecified Social Learning Models *Daniel Hauser (Aalto University)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	The Value of a Coordination Game	An Explanation-Based approach to
	*Willemien Kets (University of Oxford)	Combining Forecasts
		*Ronny Razin (London School of
		Economics and CEPR)

Friday, 13 July

Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30	Incentive compatible estimators	
	*Kfir Eliaz (Tel Aviv University and CEPR)	

Morning Parallel Session

10.00 - 11.00	Equilibrium Counterfactuals	Equilibrium Contracts and Boundedly
	*Gilles Chemla (Imperial College, London	Rational Expectations
	and CEPR)	*Heidi Thysen (London School of
		Economics)

* Indicates the presenter

ESSET 2018 Organisers:

Dirk Bergemann (Yale and CEPR) Alessandro Bonatti (MIT Sloan and CEPR) Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton) Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR) Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR) Xavier Vives (IESE Business School and CEPR)

Standing organising committee for ESSET:

Chair: Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR)

Johannes Hörner (Yale University and CEPR), Margaret Meyer (Oxford University and CEPR), Stephen Morris (Princeton University), Dirk Niepelt (Study Center Gerzensee and CEPR), Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR), Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR), Sven Rady (University of Bonn and CEPR), Joel Sobel (University of California, San Diego), Xavier Vives (IESE Business School, Barcelona and CEPR) and Lucy White (Boston University and CEPR)