

EUROPEAN SUMMER SYMPOSIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY

Generously hosted by Study Center Gerzensee

PROGRAMME

WEEK 1

July 4th – 8th 2022

Monday, 4 July

Focus Session on Credible Mechanisms

08.30 – 09.30

Credible Auctions

*Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford University) with Shengwu Li (Harvard University)

09.30 – 10.30

Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment

*Laura Doval (Columbia Business School and CEPR) with Vasiliki Skreta (UT Austin, UCL and CEPR)

10.30 -11:00

Coffee break

11:00 – 12:00

On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Auction

*Songzi Du (UC San Diego) with Ben Brooks (University of Chicago)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 – 21.30

Keeping Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms

*Andrea Attar (TSE) with Eloisa Campioni (Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata) Thomas Mariotti (TSE and CEPR) and Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University and CEPR)

Gradual Learning from Incremental Actions

*Julia Salmi (University of Copenhagen) with Tuomas Laiho (Finnish Ministry of Finance) and Pauli Murto (Aalto University)

Tuesday, 5 July

Focus Session on Credible Mechanisms

08.30 – 09.30

Taxing Externalities with Unequal Incomes

*Mallesh Pai (Rice University and CEPR) with Philipp Strack (Yale University and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 – 21.30

Should the Timing of Inspections be Predictable?

*Jan Knopfle (Aalto University) with Ian Ball (MIT)

Network Formation and Heterogeneous Risks

*Antonio Cabrales (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and CEPR) with Piero Gottardi (University of Essex and CEPR)

Wednesday, 6 July

Focus Session on Credible Mechanisms

08.30 – 09.30

Auctions for homogeneous goods: a case for pay-as-bid

*Marek Pycia (University of Zurich and CEPR) with Kyle Woodward (University of North Carolina)

9.30 – 10.30

Timing decisions under model uncertainty

*Sarah Auster (University of Bonn and CEPR) with Christian Kellner (University of Southampton)

10.30 – 11.00

Coffee break

11.00 – 12.00

Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisticated?"

*Jiangtao Li (Singapore Management University) with Piotr Dworciak (Northwestern University)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 – 21.30

Fighting for Lemons: The Encouragement Effect in Dynamic Competition with Private Information

*Marc Möller (University of Bern) with Juan Beccuti (University of Bern)

False Narratives and Political Mobilization

*Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and CEPR) with Simone Galperti (UC San Diego) and Kfir Eliaz (Tel Aviv University and CEPR)

Thursday, 7 July

Focus Session on Credible Mechanisms

08.30 – 09.30

Dominance and Optimality

*Tilman Börgers (University of Michigan)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 – 21.30

Communication in the shadow of catastrophe

*Dezső Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR) and Inga Deimen (University of Arizona and CEPR)

Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents

*Denis Kattwinkel (UCL) with Axel Niemeyer (BGSE, University of Bonn), Justus Preusser (BGSE, University of Bonn) and Alexander Winter (BGSE, University of Bonn)

Friday, 8 July

Morning Session

08.30 – 09.30

Investment incentives in near-optimal mechanisms

*Shengwu Li (Harvard University) with Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford University), Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University) and Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)

Morning Parallel Session

10.00 – 11.00

A Welfare Analysis of a Steady-State Model of Observational Learning

*Meg Meyer (University of Oxford and CEPR) with Eszter Kabos (University of Oxford)

Privacy-Preserving Auctions

*Ran Eilat (Ben-Gurion University) with Kfir Eliaz (Tel Aviv University and University of Utah) and Xiaosheng Mu (Princeton University)

* Indicates the presenter

ESSET 2022 Organisers:

Scientific coordinators: Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania and CEPR) and Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR)

Chair of the Organising Committee: Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR)

Week 1: Vasiliki Skreta (UT Austin, UCL and CEPR) and Joel Sobel (UC San Diego)

Week 2: Emir Kamenica (Chicago Booth) Stephen Morris (MIT and CEPR)

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Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University and CEPR)

Johannes Hörner (Yale University and CEPR)

Emir Kamenica (University of Chicago and CEPR)

Margaret Meyer (University of Oxford and CEPR)

Stephen Morris (MIT and CEPR)

Dirk Niepelt (Study Center Gerzensee and CEPR)

Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton University)

Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR)

Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR)

Joel Sobel (UC San Diego)

Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR)

Xavier Vives (IESE Business School, Barcelona and CEPR)

Lucy White (Boston University and CEPR)

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WEEK 2

July 11th – 15th 2022

Monday, 11 July

Focus Session on Value and Cost of Information Gathering and Processing

08.30 – 09.30

Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture

*Balázs Szentes (LSE) with Alkis Georgiadis-Harris (LSE) and Thomas Brzustowski (LSE)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 – 21.30

Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition

*Ludmila Matyskova (University of Bonn) with Alfonso Montes (École Polytechnique)

Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective

*Alex Smolin (TSE and CEPR) with Laura Doval (Columbia Business School and CEPR)

Tuesday, 12 July

Focus Session on Value and Cost of Information Gathering and Processing

08.30 – 09.30

Modeling Machine Learning

*Andrew Caplin (NYU) with Daniel Martin (Northwestern University) and Philip Marx (Louisiana State University)

09.30 – 10.30

Inattentive Economies

George-Marios Angeletos (MIT) and *Karthik Sastry (MIT)

10.30 - 11:00

Coffee break

11:00 – 12:00

Information Acquisition, Efficiency, and Non-Fundamental Volatility

*Ben Hébert (Stanford University) with Jennifer La'O (Columbia University and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 – 21.30

Information Choice in Auctions

* Nina Bobkova (Rice University and CEPR)

Persuasion as Matching

*Anton Kolotolin (UNSW Business School) with Alex Wolitsky (MIT)

Wednesday, 13 July

Focus Session on Value and Cost of Information Gathering and Processing

08.30 – 09.30

Applications of Power Diagrams to Mechanism and Information Design

*Benny Moldovanu (University of Bonn and CEPR) with Andreas Kleiner (Arizona State University) and Philipp Strack (Yale University and CEPR) and Mark Withmeyer (Arizona State University)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 – 21.30

Persuasion Duality

*Piotr Dworczak (Northwestern University) with Anton Kolotolin (UNSW Business School)

Consumer Search and Choice Overload

*Volker Nocke (University of Mannheim and CEPR) with Patrick Rey (TSE and CEPR)

Thursday, 14 July

Focus Session on Value and Cost of Information Gathering and Processing

08.30 – 09.30

Protracted Learning and Preemptive Stopping: the Wald Problem with Ambiguity

*Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University) with Sarah Auster (University of Bonn and CEPR) and Konrad Mierendorff (UCL)

9.30 – 10.30

The Indirect Cost of Information

*Weijie Zhong (Stanford Graduate School of Business) with Alex Bloedel (Caltech)

10.30 – 11.00

Coffee break

11.00 – 12.00

Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness

*Anne-Katrin Roesler (University of Toronto) with Rahul Deb (University of Toronto and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 – 21.30

(In)efficiency in Information Acquisition and Aggregation Through Prices

*Xavier Vives (IESE Business School and CEPR) with Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University and CEPR)

Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring

*Ming Yang (UCL) with Liang Dai (Shanghai Jiao Tong University) and Yenan Wang (University of Amsterdam)

Friday, 15 July

Morning Session

08.30 – 09.30

The Optimality of Coarse Menus

*Dirk Bergemann (Yale University and CEPR) with Tibor Heumann (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile) and Stephen Morris (MIT and CEPR)

Morning Parallel Session

10.00 – 11.00

Consumer Theory in the Dark

*Jakub Steiner (University of Edinburgh and CEPR) with Colin Stewart (University of Toronto) and Pavel Kocourek (CERGE-EI)

Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence

*Roland Strausz (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and CEPR) with Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

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